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Recently [1], Conway and Kochen have shown that, in Quantum Mechan-
ics(QM), there is a mathematical correlation between the freedom of the observer
to observe (or not) a particle and the indetermination of some property of the
particle in the theory; this is essentially the meaning of their Free-Will Theorem
(FWT). The introduction of the notion of observer’s freedom has shed a new
light on the subject. Conway and Kochen used four axioms (three from QM and
one of geometrical nature), and their proof involves some subtle, mostly physi-
cal, arguments. In [2] we have given a purely logical proof of the FWT, based on
only two of their axioms (one from QM and the geometrical one, but expressed
in formal logic). Here we show that the hypothesis of observer’s freedom is
not necessary for the conclusion, provided the consistency (non-contradiction)
of QM is assumed. This paper is self-contained, the main ideas, however, come
from [2].
Introduction: the Logical Setting
Let F be the physico-mathematical theory in which QM are expressed; we con-
sider F as a deductive theory in classical logic with ⊢ as the corresponding
deductive symbol. A(t, i) is a predicate symbol for ‘at time t, A observes a
particle and verifies (measures) some property (value) depending on the param-
eter (or direction) i ’; and P (t, i) is for ‘at time t the particle has the observed
property on the same parameter i ’. We suppose that F contains the following
two axioms:
Ob ∀t ∀i (A(t, i)→ P (t, i))
Im ∀t q∀i P (t, i), where i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Ob (for observational) and Im (for impossibility) are, respectively, Axioms 2
and 3 in [2], where their meaning in QM is explained. Briefly, Ob is given by
the experimental (observational) evidence in QM (e.g. by observation and mea-
surement of the spin values in different directions i in an EPR-like experiment
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or by separate measurements of position (i = 1) or momentum (i = 2) of a par-
ticle), while Im is given by mathematical elementary probability theory (Bell’s
theorem [3]) or geometrical evidence (Kochen–Specker theorem, as it is used
in the proof of Conway and Kochen) or given by physical evidence (Heisenberg
uncertainty principle: it is impossible to observe position and momentum at the
same time).
The notion of freedom of the observer, relative to the deduction in theory F ,
is defined naturally (as in [2]) by
∀t ∀i (F 0 A(t, i) ∧ F 0 qA(t, i)).
while the indetermination or freedom (following Conway and Kochen) of the
particle relative to the observed property in the theory F is defined by
∀t ∃i (F 0 P (t, i) ∧ F 0 qP (t, i)).
Following Conway and Kochen, we say briefly that the (behaviour of the) particle
is free in F , for the more correct statement that the observed property of the
particle is undetermined in F .
In [2] we have proved the main non-deterministic theorem:
Theorem 1. If a consistent theory F verifies axioms Ob and Im, then the
freedom of the observer implies the freedom of the particle relative to theory F .
This applies to the theory F of QM, where the freedom of the observer
(resp. particle) is verified if F = F (t′) contains only events that happen at
time t′ < t (where t is the time of observation): the behaviour of the observer
is not predetermined by the theory (and, consequently, says the theorem, nor
is the behaviour of the particle for some parameter). For n = 2, in the case
of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the theorem shows that the freedom or
non-determinism of the behaviour of particles could have been established on
logical grounds since the very beginning of QM.
The proof of this theorem is not needed in what follows.
Consistency and Non-Determinism
It is important to note, first, that the physical theory F containing QM, as a
whole, contains the mathematics needed for real (and complex) analysis neces-
sary to express physics and contains no more axioms on infinity than those of
Analysis. Consequently, the consistency of F , as a whole, supposes the consis-
tency of the mathematics used. While, concerning non-determinism, the incom-
pleteness of mathematics (e.g. real analysis) is well known, we are concerned
here only with the non-determinism of physical events. We write Cons = Cons
F for the formula expressing the consistency of F as is usual in Mathematical
Logic (formally, it means that F 0 0 = 1). The purpose here is to eliminate the
hypothesis of observer’s freedom; for this Ob is modified in the following way:
COb ∀t ∀i ((Cons→ A(t, i))→ P (t, i)).
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The axiom COb is obviously stronger than Ob; its meaning has to be ex-
plained. If F is consistent, the two axioms are equivalent. Literally, in COb
the observation is conditional: if, whenever F is consistent, A observes the par-
ticle, then the particle verifies property P (t, i). But Cons F does not depend
on time; thus, believing in the consistency of F , informally, COb has the same
meaning as Ob. Moreover it is easy to prove formally that Cons ⊢ COb ↔ Ob
and ⊢ ConsF ↔ Cons(F +COb) (recall that F contains Ob and Im). If Cons
is true (as will be assumed) COb reduces to Ob, and if Cons is false, COb re-
duces to ∀ t ∀ i P (t, i), which contradicts Im; consequently, in this case, F , as
expected, is false (contradictory). Moreover, the notion of freedom vanishes if
the theory is not consistent.
Believing in Cons, there are no reasons in physics not to accept COb if
we accept Ob, which belongs to experimental physics (in the cases mentioned
above: EPR, Heisenberg’s, or others). But, formally, provably, we have
Theorem 2. If F is consistent, then COb implies that there are free particles
relative to the theory F .
Proof. Suppose the particle is not free, then (using the definition of freedom of
the particle)
(∗) ∃t ∀i (F ⊢ P (t, i) ∨ F ⊢ qP (t, i)).
But F ⊢ P (t, i) for all i contradicts Im; therefore, for some i,
∃t (F ⊢ qP (t, i)).
Now, because of COb, this implies
∃t ∃i (F ⊢ q (Cons→ A(t, i));
hence, for some t and i, F ⊢ Cons∧ qA(t, i) and F ⊢ ConsF . However, because
of Go¨del’s theorem, this is impossible if F is consistent.
Commentary and Improvement
Thus, if we assume informally (that’s only what we can do) that the QM the-
ory F is consistent and we accept COb, which in this case, informally, reduces
to Ob (included in QM), then formally the determinism (∗) of F implies the
inconsistency of F . This contradiction shows that (∗) is impossible and that
there are free behaviors of particles in QM.
Now, the question naturally arises: Which real logical or physical part in F
implies contradiction? If we suppose F provably consistent, then, of course,
Cons is false and implies any formula. For example, for all F , trivially, qConsF ,
F ⊢⊥ (always false); hence F ⊢ q q Cons and, classically, F ⊢ Cons. But this is
based on the assumption that, provably, Cons is true, which is, of course, not
the case in the proof of the theorem. However, we have here, formally and not
using the meaning of q Cons or qConsF , F ⊢⊥:
(∗∗) qCons,COb, Im ⊢⊥,
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because qCons, together with
∀t ∀i ((Cons→ A(t, i))→ P (t, i)),
imply ∀t ∀i P (t, i), which contradicts Im. And, from (**), therefore we obtain
COb, Im ⊢ Cons. It is then possible to argue that the conclusion F ⊢ ConsF in
the proof results simply from COb and Im and not genuinely from QM (in F ),
although, in the proof, F appears from the physical assumption (∗) and the
contradiction follows from F ⊢ qP (t, i).
To avoid this difficulty, axiom Im can be superseded by the following axiom:
CIm Cons→ Im or, explicitly, Cons→ ∀t q∀i P (t, i)
This axiom is unquestionable, because it is a consequence of Im, and Im is,
as for Kochen–Specker’s (or resp. Bell’s) theorem, an elementary geometrical—
especially, in the simple proof using Peres construction (see [1])—(or resp. el-
ementary probabilistic) result; and if the theory is consistent, then necessarily,
it requires Im, since q Im implies q Cons.
But, with CIm, we have no equivalent of (**) (without using q Cons ⊢⊥),
and we cannot formally deduce Cons from COb and CIm. Nevertheless, if F0 is
F without Ob and Im (thus, F = F0 +Ob+ Im) and if we set
F ′ = F0 +COb+CIm,
then we have
(∗ ∗ ∗) ConsF ⊢ ConsF ′
(recall that Cons,Ob ⊢ COb and that Cons = ConsF )
and the following:
Theorem 3. If F is consistent, then F’ is consistent and there are free particles
relative to the theory F ′.
Proof. It is essentially the same as for Theorem 2. Suppose we have (∗) with F
=F ′; then, since F ′ ⊢ P (t, i) for all i and CIm or Cons→ ∀ t q∀ i P (t, i) would
imply F ′ ⊢ q Cons, while, because of (***), this is impossible (since Cons ⊢
q ConsF ′ would follow), we must have, as above, F ′ ⊢ qP (t, i) for some t and
i, which, with COb, implies F ′ ⊢ ConsF , and hence F ′ ⊢ ConsF ′ with the
same conclusion that this is impossible, since F and (therefore) F ′ are assumed
consistent.
It should be remarked that the hypothesis on the observer’s freedom is not
necessary in the proof; apart from the informal assumption of the consistency
of QM, no other hypothesis is needed. The result can be formulated in the
following way.
Theorem 4. Assuming the theory of Quantum Mechanics to be consistent, there
are necessarily physical events that are undetermined in the theory. The incom-
pleteness of Mathematics relative to consistency implies the non-determinism of
Physics relative to physical events.
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This shows how deeply mathematical truth and physical truth are inter-
linked.
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